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Real Property
by Linda S. Finley*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article reviews notable real property issues arising from the
decisions of the appellate courts of Georgia as well as legislation enacted
by the Georgia General Assembly. Real property law is often thought of
as stodgy, particularly with the roots of the practice arising from English
common law. However, real property law is ever-changing and often
touches on a myriad of issues necessitating the need for the topics
reviewed in this Article. This Article provides the practitioner, student,
or layperson with a guide to those court decisions entered and legislation
enacted during the survey period.'
II. LEGISLATION

2

The 2017 regular session of the 153rd Georgia General Assembly
convened on January 9, 2017 and adjourned sine die on March 31, 2017.
It was a session filled with many bills, however, few passed. There were
2,270 pieces of legislation introduced during the 2017 General Assembly
with only a small number passing both chambers. 3

*Shareholder in the firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC,
Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (B.A., 1978); Mercer University School of Law (J.D.,
1981). Member State and Federal Bars of Georgia and Florida, Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals, and the Supreme Court of the United States.
1. For an analysis of real property law during the prior survey period, see Linda S.
Finley, Real Property,Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 68 MERCER L. REV. 231 (2016).
2. For an outline of the 2017 legislative session, including a discussion on bills
concerning real estate issues which were brought before the legislature but did not become
law during the session, see Kent E. Altom, Deborah S. Bailey & Monica K. Gilroy, 2017
Legislative Update, 2017 REAL PROP. LAW INST. (Institute of Continuing Legal Education
in Georgia) (2017) and Mo Thrash, Legislative Report from Underthe Gold Dome, LOBBYIST
NEWSLETTER (Mortgage Bankers Association of Georgia), Mar. 31, 2017 (on file with
Author).
3. Thrash, supra note 2, at 1.
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House Bill 337,4 the State Tax Execution Modernization Act,
established a statewide tax-lien registry for all tax liens and has
modernized provisions relating to the transmittal, filing recording, access
to, and territorial effect of tax liens issued by the Georgia Department of
Revenue. 5 The Act goes into effect on January 1, 2018. The Act amends
Titles 11, 15, 44, and 48 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated
(O.C.G.A.) relating to the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.), superior
court clerks, property, and revenue, and taxation. 6 It provides definitions
and technological advances in electronic record keeping relating to the
filing and public access to state tax liens. 7 It also establishes a process
for obtaining certificates of clearance of state tax liens, and provides for
duties and responsibilities of the Georgia Superior Court Clerks'
Cooperative Authority.8
House Bill 1979 amended O.C.G.A. § 10-1-15,10 adding additional
provisions to the Fair Business Practices Act"1 to add definitions and
requirements for individuals or companies who solicit services for
obtaining real estate instruments.1 2 The amendment defines
"instrument[s] conveying real estate" as "any documentary material
evidencing an interest in real property required under law to be recorded
with the superior court in the county in which the land is located,
including, but not limited to, a deed to secure debt, a mortgage, a deed
under power, and a lien."13 Any person who mails a solicitation for
services to obtain such instruments must include these specific words
within the solicitation: "THIS IS NOT A BILL OR OFFICIAL
GOVERNMENT DOCUMENT. THIS IS A SOLICITATION."14 These
words must be in at least sixteen-point Helvetica font at the top of the
document, and the heading must be at least two inches apart from any
other text on the solicitation.' 5 Further, the text of the solicitation itself

4. Ga. H.R. Bill 337, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 257 (amending O.C.G.A. tits. 11, 15,
44, 48 (2017)).
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8.
9.
(2017)).
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id.
Ga. H.R. Bill 197, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 67 (amending O.C.G.A. § 10-1-15
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-15 (2017).
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-390-408 (2017).
Ga. H.R. Bill 197, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 67.
Id. § 1(a).
Id. § 1(b).
Id.
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cannot be larger than the required words. 16 "Failure to comply with
[these] provisions .

.

. shall be considered an unfair or deceptive act or

practice which is unlawful and which shall be punishable by"1 7 those
penalties set out in O.C.G.A. § 10-1-39018 and, more specifically, O.C.G.A.
§ 10-1-405.19
House Bill 43420 amended statutes relative to eminent domain to
define and address how condemning parties could treat blighted
property, and provides an exception to the requirement that parties not
convert condemned property to any use other than a public use for twenty
years from the initial condemnation. 21 Most particularly, the amendment
creates a new section, O.C.G.A. § 22-1-15,22 that sets out the procedure
for condemnation of blighted areas where a public use is not immediately
known and "economic development is a secondary or ancillary public
benefit of condemnation." 23 The amendment identifies what must be
alleged, who should be served with notice of the condemnation, and how
those parties should be served with such notice. 24 The amendment
requires a hearing before a superior court, a judicial determination that
all necessary parties received proper service, and that the potentially
condemned property is deemed "blighted." 25 If the court deems the
property as blighted, its order must include, or:
a statement of the then current approved land use of the property, or
in the case of vacant property, the last lawful use for which the
property was occupied, and such property's future use shall be
restricted to the same land use as stated in the order for a period of
26
five years from the date of the order.

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
(2017)).
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.
Id. § 1(c).
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-405 (2017).
Ga. H.R. Bill 434, Reg. Sess., 2017 Ga. Laws 265 (amending O.C.G.A. tit. 22 ch. 1
Id.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.
O.C.G.A.

§ 22-1-15 (2017).
§ 22-1-15(a)(3) (2017).
§ 22-1-15(e)-(g) (2017).
§ 22-1-15 (2017).
§ 22-1-15(h) (2017).
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III. TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY 27

In Tyrones v. Tyrones,28 the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court's denial of Dennis Tyrones's (Dennis) motion to set aside a partition
sale of property he had jointly owned with his deceased brother, whose
50% interest was awarded to his widow (Andrea) and children by the
probate court. 29 Andrea filed an action to partition the property, and the
parties, by consent order, agreed to appraise the property and to sell it at
a partition sale if necessary. Following the procedure set forth in the
consent order, Andrea obtained an appraisal valuing the property at
$175,000 and served the appraisal on Dennis. When Dennis failed to
obtain a second appraisal, Andrea's appraisal established the fair market
value of the property under the consent order. Subsequently, Andrea filed
notice that Dennis had elected not to exercise the option to purchase
Andrea's interest and sought to proceed with a public sale of the property.
Almost two years later, the trial court entered an order allowing the sale
to proceed, and Andrea purchased the property at the sale for $2,000.30
Dennis moved the trial court to set aside the partition sale, claiming
neither he nor his counsel received the service copy of the order
permitting the sale to proceed, and that he did not receive notice of the
sale date until the day before the sale. Dennis also claimed that, upon
receiving notice of the sale, he notified two of the appointed
commissioners that he would be present and bid at the sale, and further
claimed that he arranged to secure sufficient funds. Dennis went to the
courthouse for the sale, but left prior to the sale to obtain certified funds.
Upon his return, the sale had been completed. The trial court denied
Dennis's motion, confirmed the sale, and found that the sale had been
properly advertised and conducted: Dennis had nearly two years to
exercise his option to avoid the sale but did not; Dennis was aware of the
process because it was part of a consent order to which Dennis agreed;
Dennis's counsel was aware of the sale since he participated in the
and Dennis often ignored
of the commissioners;
selection
communications and deadlines imposed by the trial court during the
pendency of the case. Dennis appealed. 31

27. This section was authored by Teresa L. Bailey, Of Counsel in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Florida
(B.A., 1983); Emory University School of Law (J.D., 1986). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
28. 300 Ga. 367, 792 S.E.2d 398 (2016).
29. Id. at 367-68, 792 S.E.2d at 398.
30. Id. at 368, 792 S.E.2d at 399.
31. Id. at 368-69, 792 S.E.2d at 399.
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Dennis's primary grounds for appeal were that the sale price of the
property was egregiously low, and that the sale process was improper.32
Noting that inadequacy of price is not alone sufficient to set aside a sale,
the supreme court held that Dennis's claim turned on "whether the
sale . . . was accompanied by some circumstance that might have

contributed to the low winning bid;"33 namely, fraud, mistake,
misapprehension, or surprise. 34
In review of the claim that neither Dennis nor his attorney were aware
of the trial court order setting the partition sale in motion, the supreme
court determined that the record was replete with . ignored
communications from the trial court.35 Of particular importance was the
failure to account for either why the order of sale went unnoticed or how
Dennis became aware of the sale the day before the sale date. 36 In failing
to explain the apparent confusion, the supreme court determined there
was insufficient evidence to set aside the sale.37
Dennis also asserted he was denied an opportunity to bid at the sale. 38
The supreme court determined, however, that there was no evidence to
show that Dennis was misled that the sale would be postponed until he
returned with certified funds. 39 As such, the court held that he was not
prevented from bidding but was simply absent from the sale by his own
conduct. 40
Redcedar, LLC v. CML-GA Social Circle, LLC41 is a consolidated
Georgia Court of Appeals opinion of cross-appeals from a trial court order
in a complicated timber-cutting dispute. 42 In Redcedar, a 463.74-acre
tract of land in Newton County, Georgia was collateral for three
promissory notes for which the borrower was in default. Rather than
foreclose, CML-GA Social Circle, LLC (CML-GA), the assignee of the
lender, filed suit on the notes and obtained a $9.6 million default
judgment against the borrower. After the court entered judgment,

32.
33.
34.
S.E.2d
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 369, 792 S.E.2d. at 399.
Id. at 369-70, 792 S.E.2d at 400.
Id. at 369, 792 S.E.2d at 400 (quoting Giordana v. Stubbs, 228 Ga. 75, 79, 184
165, 168-69 (1971)).
Id. at 370, 792 S.E.2d at 400.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
341 Ga. App. 110, 798 S.E.2d 334 (2017).
Id. at 110, 798 S.E.2d at 336.
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Redcedar, LLC (Redcedar), a subcontractor, was retained to cut timber
from the property and the removed trees were sold to third parties. 43
CML-GA discovered the tree removal and filed suit for conversion
against Redcedar and others. CML-GA claimed that the timber was cut
and removed without CML-GA's written permission, and the defendants
were therefore liable under the Georgia Timber Collateral Conversion
Statute (GTCCS).44 In its complaint, CML-GA sought damages for
diminution of value of the property, among other damages. During the
pendency of the suit, CML-GA foreclosed on the property and credited
$4.4 million toward the borrower's outstanding debt. Thereafter, CMLGA filed a motion for partial summary judgment, claiming that the
defendants, including Redcedar, were liable for the remaining deficiency
between the amount of borrower's indebtedness and the amount credited
from the foreclosure sale of the property. 45
In response, Redcedar filed its own motion for summary judgment
claiming that it was not liable to CML-GA under GTCCS. Redcedar
claimed that, although it admittedly cut and removed the trees, Redcedar
was acting solely as a contractor, and that foreclosure of the security
interest extinguished the "secured indebtedness," which precluded an
award of damages under the GTCCS statute. Further, Redcedar claimed
that CML-GA failed to seek confirmation of the foreclosure sale 46 and was
therefore precluded from further recovery and, even if CML-GA had
obtained confirmation of the foreclosure sale, it failed to provide
Redcedar with required statutory notice. 47 The trial court denied
Redcedar's motion for summary judgment and granted CML-GA's motion
for partial summary judgment, and found that Redcedar and its
codefendants were liable as a matter of law under GTCCS. Redcedar
appealed. 48
On appeal, Redcedar argued that it was not within the class of
defendants subject to liability under the statute for the following reasons:
it was not a party to the tree removal contract; it did not obtain the
permit from Newton County to remove the trees; it served under the
direction and instruction of the contractor; it relied on the contractor to
43. Id. at 111, 798 S.E.2d at 336.
44. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-51 (2017) (providing failure to obtain written consent from the
holder of a security interest in land by any participant involved in the removal of trees from
the land is subject to joint and several liability for the value of the removed trees, interest,
and reasonable attorney fees, in an amount not to exceed the unpaid portion of the secured
indebtedness).
45. Redcedar, LLC, 341 Ga. App. at 112, 798 S.E.2d at 337.
46. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (2017).
47. Redcedar, LLC, 341 Ga. App. at 113, 798 S.E.2d at 337.
48. Id. at 110, 798 S.E.2d at 336.

2017]

REAL PROPERTY

257

obtain the necessary permits and consents, which is consistent with
industry standards and practices; and it did not, in fact, purchase or sell
the timber at issue.4 9 In rejecting Redcedar's arguments, the court of
appeals determined that a plain reading of the statute imposed strict
liability on "anyone who cuts, removes, or otherwise converts timber from
property without the written consent" of the holder of the security
interest.50
Redcedar also argued that the statute limited liability to either the
purchaser of the timber or the borrower who held the equitable interest
in the property. In support of its argument, Redcedar pointed to the
second sentence of the statute, which addresses the liability of the
purchaser and their joint and several liability with the borrower. 51 The
court of appeals was not persuaded, and determined that this sentence
did not negate or undermine the strict liability imposed under the first
sentence of the statute. 52 The court explained that to find otherwise
would render the statute meaningless. 53 The court further determined
that Redcedar's arguments-that CML-GA could not recover under
GTCCS because it no longer held a security interest in the property and
that CML-GA could not recover against Redcedar for a deficiency after
foreclosure-were premature since the trial court had not yet ruled on
those issues. 54
On the cross-appeal, CML-GA contended that the trial court erred in
limiting its damages to the value of the trees instead of the diminution
in value of the land.55 Since there was no statutory basis for an award of
diminution of the value of the land, the court of appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.56 CML-GA also argued, however, that the evidence of
diminution of value of the land was relevant to the issue of Redcedar's
bad faith, and the court should have allowed, for the purposes of its claim,
for attorney fees and punitive damages. 57 Determining that even slightly
probative evidence was admissible, the court of appeals reversed that
portion of the trial court's order.5 8

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id. at 114, 798 S.E.2d at 338.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 115, 798 S.E.2d at 339.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 115-16, 798 S.E.2d at 339.
Id. at 116, 798 S.E.2d at 339-40.
Id. at 116, 798 S.E.2d at 340.
Id. at 117, 798 S.E.2d at 340.
Id.
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North Bay Avalon, LLLP v. Speedway, LLC 5 9 involves questions of
restrictive covenants in deeds and constitutional questions concerning
restraint of trade.6 0 In this case, a deed of conveyance in the back chain
of title contained restrictive covenants limiting the use of the land
conveyed as a gas station. North Bay Avalon, LLLP (North Bay)
purchased the DeKalb County property in 2013, fully aware of the
restrictive covenants. After closing, North Bay filed suit to quiet title to
remove the restrictive covenants. North Bay argued that the successor of
the grantor of the deed imposing the restrictive covenants, Speedway,
LLC (Speedway), could not enforce the restrictive covenants since it no
longer owned an interest in the property or an adjacent property.
Further, North Bay argues that no Georgia court had ever enforced a
covenant in which the benefits are held as a personal right (in gross) and
did not run with the land. 61The court of appeals determined that whether
the covenants were held in gross or running with the land was not
relevant since the covenants were enforceable in equity. 62 The court
reasoned that, so long as the covenants "concern the land or its use, and
that the subsequent grantee has notice of it," equity will permit
enforcement. 63 Since the covenants at issue concerned the use of the land,
and it was not in dispute that North Bay purchased the property with
64
notice of the covenants, the covenants were enforceable.
North Bay also argued that Speedway had no standing since Speedway
had no interest in either the subject property or any adjacent property,
and it therefore had no legitimate interest in enforcement of the
covenants.65 The court of appeals determined, however, that a continuing
interest in the property or adjacent property was not necessary because
the circumstances made it clear that the covenants were intended to
benefit Speedway by imposing certain limits on competition and, as such,
the trial court committed no error in finding that Speedway had
standing.6 6 North Bay also argued that the covenants operated as an
illegal restraint on trade and should be unenforceable. 67 However, the
court noted that laws prohibiting restraints on trade do not apply to

59. 340 Ga. App. 899, 797 S.E.2d 510 (2017).
60. Id. at 899, 797 S.E.2d at 511.
61. Id. at 900, 797 S.E.2d at 512.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 900-01, 797 S.E.2d at 512 (quoting Timberstone Homeowner's Ass'n v.
Summerlin, 266 Ga. 322, 323, 467 S.E.2d 330, 332 (1996)).
64. Id. at 901, 797 S.E.2d at 512.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 902, 797 S.E.2d at 513.
67. Id.
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restrictive covenants on the use of real property, and the trial court did
not err in finding that the covenants were not unenforceable restraints
on trade. 68
In Gens v. White,69 the supreme court issued a nuanced quiet title
opinion. April Gens (Gens) purchased a 4.3-acre tract of land adjacent to
Lake Lanier in Forsyth County that she subdivided into residential lots
and created lake access for each lot. Gens obtained two loans from
Lumpkin County Bank (the Bank). The first loan granted a security deed
to all of the property in 1999, and the second loan intended to grant a
security deed to lots zero, seven, and eight in 2001. The 2001 security
deed, however, mistakenly described only part of lot seven, which
consisted of approximately 150 square feet. Gens defaulted on her loans,
filed for bankruptcy protection, and surrendered her interests in all of
the properties (except her residence and vehicle). Finding that Gens had
no equity interest in lots zero, seven, or eight, the court lifted the
bankruptcy stay to allow the foreclosure of the properties. 70
The Bank foreclosed on what it believed to be lot seven, and sold it to
a third party who then sold it to John White (White). White built a house
on lot seven and paid all accrued taxes. More than six years after his
purchase, Gens filed a quiet title action asserting legal ownership of lot
seven because White's deed conveyed only "part of lot 7." White
counterclaimed to reform the deeds in his chain of title alleging the legal
description was erroneous due to accident, mistake, or fraud. 71 A special
master was appointed who found that Gens was equitably estopped from
claiming title to lot seven. Relying on the case Mitchell v. Mitchell,72 the
trial court agreed that Gens was equitably estopped from pursuing any
claim to any part of lot seven.78 Gens appealed, arguing that the trial
court's reliance on Mitchell was in error. 74 The supreme court agreed.7 5
In Mitchell, a father attempted to equally divide his land among his
five children, and deeded each a five-acre parcel. Later, the father
directed his son Richard to build a house on the wrong property, and
Richard built the house with the assistance of the father and some or all
of the siblings. It was not until the father died that the siblings
complained that Richard built his house on the wrong lot. A jury awarded

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id.
299 Ga. 637, 791 S.E.2d 48 (2016).
Id. at 637, 791 S.E.2d at 48.
Id. at 638, 791 S.E.2d at 48.
274 Ga. 633, 634, 555 S.E.2d 436, 437-38 (2001).
Gens, 299 Ga. at 638, 791 S.E.2d at 49.

Id.
Id.
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the house to Richard.76 The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the
complaining parties were not blameless since they did not complain
about the location of the house until after the father died and, in fact,
helped with the construction.7 7 Applying the principals of equity, the
most equitable solution to the conflict was to award Richard the house.78
The court of appeals in Gens ruled the Mitchell case distinguishable
because "Gens took no action to lead White to believe he was entitled to
the disputed property . .. she must be viewed as being entirely blameless,
and cannot be estopped from asserting title to the [disputed] property." 79
On remand, however, "the trial court [was] directed to determine the
merits of the reformation counterclaim."8 0
Johnson v. Thomas 81 was the second appearance of the case before the
court of appeals regarding a dispute between the national Christian
Methodist Episcopal Church (CME) and the trustees, pastor, and former
members of the Bethel Christian Methodist Episcopal Church (Bethel
Church) over church property deeded to the trustees of Bethel Church in
1996 (the Property). In 2011, members of Bethel Church voted to
disaffiliate from the CME because the thirty members of the church could
not afford to pay required CME fees, the pastors provided by CME were
inadequate, and there was no financial support from CME to repair the
building or meet the church's financial obligations. Thereafter, CME filed
a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief seeking an order
that CME was the legal and equitable owner of the Property pursuant to
church law established by CME's Book of Discipline. Applying "neutral
principals of law," 82 the trial court found that "local churches, such as
Bethel Church, hold title to any property, real or personal, in an implied
trust for the national CME [church]." 83 As a result, Bethel Church only
had permissive use of the Property, and the trustees held title to the
Property in trust for the CME. The trial court enjoined the members of
Bethel Church from interfering with CME's use of the Property. 84
On appeal, Bethel Church argued that the trial court erred by not
considering the language used in the 1996 deed, which conveyed the

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Mitchell, 274 Ga. at 633, 791 S.E.2d at 437.
Id. at 634, 791 S.E.2d at 437-38.
Id. at 634, 791 S.E.2d at 438.
Gens, 299 Ga. at 638-39, 791 S.E.2d at 49.
Id. at 639, 791 S.E.2d at 49.
337 Ga. App. 857, 788 S.E.2d 124 (2016).
Id. at 859, 788 S.E.2d at 126.
Id.
Id.
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Property to the trustees only and sought to exclude the national CME.85
In considering the matter, the court of appeals concluded that its
ultimate goal was "to determine 'the intentions of the parties' at the local
and national level[s] regarding beneficial ownership of the property"
before the matter became a litigated dispute.8 6
To determine the intent, the court not only reviewed the 1996 deed,
but also the governing church documents-namely, the Book of
Discipline. 87 "Since it [was] uncontroverted that the Bethel Church was
a connectional member of the CME since at least the 1960s until ... 2011,
there [was] no question that the trustees held the [Property] subject to
the Book of Discipline."8 8 According to the Book of Discipline, even if a
deed conveying property does not contain a trust clause in favor of the
CME, its absence does not relieve the local church of its responsibilities
to the CME if several indicia enumerated in the Book of Discipline show
intent, including the conveyance of the property to the trustees of a local
connectional member church, the local church holding itself out as a
member church, acceptance of CME ministers, and use of CME taxexempt privileges.89 The court determined at least three of the
enumerated indications present.9 0
Bethel Church pointed to evidence that it intended to exclude the CME
at the time of the 1996 deed grant, including that it considered itself a de
facto member of the CME and did not benefit from the relationship with
it.91 However, the court of appeals determined that the Book of Discipline
bound Bethel Church at the time of the 1996 deed was granted even
though there was dissatisfaction with the CME at the time. 92 In fact,
Bethel Church continued to operate as a member for several years after
the execution of the 1996 deed, paid assessments to the CME, regularly
attended CME conferences, and accepted pastors assigned by the CME
through 2011.93

The court determined that Bethel Church could not "enter a binding
relationship with [the] parent church which has provisions of implied
trust in its [governing documents], yet deny the existence of such [a]

85. Id. at 860, 788 S.E.2d at 126.
86. Id. at 860, 788 S.E.2d at 127 (quoting Presbytery of Greater Atlanta v. Timberridge
Presbyterian Church, Inc., 290 Ga. 272, 276-77, 719 S.E.2d 446, 450 (2011)).
87. Id. at 860-61, 788 S.E.2d at 127.
88. Id. at 861, 788 S.E.2d at 127.
89. Id. at 862, 788 S.E.2d at 128.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 863, 788 S.E.2d at 128.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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relationship." 94 Since the Book of Discipline governed the relationship at
the time of the 1996 deed and Bethel Church did not sever ties with the
CME until years later, the trial court's order in favor of the CME was
affirmed. 95
96
the
In Shiv Aban, Inc. v. Georgia Department of Transportation,

court of appeals partially reversed a condemnation award in favor of Shiv
Aban, Inc. (Shiv Aban) because the trial court failed to award
prejudgment interest against the Georgia Department of Transportation
(DOT), and failed to apportion the expenses incurred by Shiv Aban to
those expenses associated with the DOT's sanctionable conduct.9 7
The Shiv Aban property was a motel located in Catoosa County,
Georgia (the Motel). In April 2011, a tornado damaged the Motel, and
Shiv Aban spent approximately $857,000 restoring the Motel for its
reopening in June 2012. The DOT petitioned to condemn the Motel on
September 12, 2013, and paid $430,000 into the court's registry as its
estimate of just and adequate compensation based on an affidavit of
value from an appraiser who relied upon photographs dated November
2011-all of which showed a tornado-damaged motel-to determine the
property value. The affidavit, which formed the basis of the valuation
claimed by the DOT, was dated nine months before the filing of the
condemnation petition.98
Shiv Aban timely filed a notice of appeal demanding a trial by jury and
sought an interlocutory hearing on the issue of whether the DOT
deposited a sufficient amount. Under the applicable statutes, the trial
court appointed a board of assessors to determine the correct amount to
be deposited into the court. At the hearing before the board of assessors,
the DOT presented a different appraiser who testified the value of the
Motel was $1.7 million. The board of assessors approved the new amount.
Satisfied with the determination of the board of assessors, Shiv Aban
dismissed its appeal and the valuation of the board of assessors became
final. Thereafter, Shiv Aban sought an award of prejudgment interest on
the difference between the initial amount paid by the DOT and the
amount determined by the board of assessors. The trial court denied the
request and found that an award of prejudgment interest could only
follow a jury verdict.99

94. Id. at 863, 788 S.E.2d at 129.
95. Id. at 857-58, 788 S.E.2d at 125.
96. 336 Ga. App. 804, 784 S.E.2d 134 (2016).
97. Id. at 804, 784 S.E.2d at 136-37.
98. Id. at 817, 784 S.E.2d at 145.
99. Id. at 813, 784 S.E.2d at 142. Compare O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19(c) (2017), with O.C.G.A.
§ 32-3-15 (2017).
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The court of appeals examined the interplay between the pertinent
statutes, and determined that the prejudgment interest provision
contained in O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19(c)100 applied to all judgments, including
judgments following interlocutory awards.1 0 1 As such, the trial court
erred when it failed to award prejudgment interest on the $1.27 million
difference between the amount initially paid and the judgment entered
by the court during the eleven months it took to correct the valuation.
The court determined further that since the taking of the Motel occurred
as of the date of the filing of the petition, and since the taking deprived
Shiv Aban of $1.27 million of its property from the filing date through the
date of judgment, there was nothing unreasonable in interpreting the
applicability of prejudgment interest in this instance, which is consistent
with the traditional understanding of how to award interest. 102
Turning to the question of the attorney fees and expenses awarded to
Shiv Aban by the trial court under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14,103 which the DOT
appealed, the court rejected the DOT's insistence that O.C.G.A.
§ 32-3-11104 limited Shiv Aban's relief, setting aside the taking, which
must be filed within thirty days of the taking.105 The court found wellsettled law allowing O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 to apply to condemnation
cases, 106 and the conduct Shiv Aban complained about was not prelitigation activity that would not award attorney fees.1 07 The conduct
Shiv Aban complained about was the DOT's use of a legally-inapplicable
appraisal when it filed its application of taking-the pleading that
commenced the litigation.108
The fact that the fee arrangement between Shiv Aban and its counsel
was a contingency fee did not invalidate the award since the evidence
demonstrated that the arrangement was the usual or customary fee for
such cases and a valid indicator of the value of the professional services
rendered.1 09 The court noted that counsel for Shiv Aban also introduced
evidence of the hours, rates, and value of the professional services
actually rendered; apportioned the fees sought to the DOT's sanctionable
conduct; the fees claimed were only approximately 31% of the award; and

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19(c).
Shiv Aban, Inc., 336 Ga. App. at 808, 784 S.E.2d at 139.
Id. at 810, 784 S.E.2d at 140.
O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14 (2017).
O.C.G.A. § 32-3-11 (2017).
Shiv Aban, Iac., 336 Ga. App. at 818, 784 S.E.2d at 145.
Id. at 816, 784 S.E.2d at 144.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 819, 784 S.E.2d at 146.
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found the fees not unreasonable considering the potential risk posed by
litigation in general. 110 However, since there was no evidence
apportioning the expenses sought, the court vacated that portion of the
award and remanded it with direction that the trial court take evidence
apportioning the expenses."
In RES-GA YPL, LLC v. Rowland,112 a judgment creditor sued a debtor
and various parties related to the debtor seeking to set aside conveyances
of real property as fraudulent under Georgia's Uniform Fraudulent
Transfers Act (GUFTA),113 and requested declaratory judgment that its
interest in certain real property was superior to all other claims. The trial
court dismissed the case on defendants' motion. 114 The court of appeals
affirmed in part and reversed in part. 115
The case is factually complex. In 2007, a non-party limited liability
company obtained a $3.5 million loan guaranteed by J.H. Rowland, III
(Rowland) secured by real property located in Cobb County. The Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) took over the originating lender
and sold the loan and guaranty to a third party, who later sold them to
RES-GA YPL, LLC (YPL). The loan went into default, YPL foreclosed on
the Cobb County property, confirmed the sale, sued for the deficiency,
and obtained a default judgment against Rowland in August 2012. The
writ of fieri facias was not recorded until February 2013.116
On September 4, 2012, after the entry of the default judgment, several
"corrective deeds" (the Corrective Deeds) were executed and filed in the
deed records of Burke County, purportedly to correct deeds signed in
2003 (the 2003 Deeds) that transferred hundreds of acres of real property
(the Properties) among Rowland and parties related to Rowland (the
Rowland Affiliates). 117 The 2003 Deeds had not been recorded, dated with
month or day, or witnessed, but they were attached to and recorded with
the Corrective Deeds.118 The first corrective deed purported to "confirm"
the conveyance of a 264-acre tract of property from Rowland's mother, in
her capacity as the executrix of the estate of her late husband, to herself,
Rowland, and Rowland's sister. The second corrective deed was a
110. Id. at 819-20, 784 S.E.2d at 146.
111. Id. at 821, 784 S.E.2d at 147.
112. 340 Ga. App. 713, 798 S.E.2d 315 (2017).
113. O.C.G.A. §§ 18-2-70-80 (2017).
114. RES-GAYPL, LLC, 340 Ga. App. at 713, 798 S.E.2d at 317.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 715, 798 S.E.2d at 318.
117. Id. at 713, 798 S.E.2d at 317. The Rowland Affiliates are Marilyn Jones Rowland
(Rowland's mother), Katherine Rowland Boudreau (Rowland's sister), Rowland Partners,
LP, Rowland Companies, Inc., and MJR Finance LLC. Id.
118. Id. at 715, 798 S.E.2d at 318.
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quitclaim deed purporting to "confirm" the conveyance by Rowland and
his sister of their shares in the 264-acre tract to Rowland Partners, LP.
The third corrective deed purported to "confirm" the conveyance of 1,882
acres of property from Rowland's mother to herself, Rowland, and
Rowland's sister. The fourth corrective deed was a quitclaim deed
purporting to "confirm" the conveyance of the 1,882 acres of property
from Rowland and his sister to Rowland Partners, LP.119
In December 2012, Rowland Partners, LP executed and recorded a
security deed (MJR Security Deed) purporting to convey the partnership
interest in both tracts to MJR Finance LLC in order to secure repayment
of a $350,000 note. 120 In 2015, YPL filed suit seeking damages and to
enforce its judgment by voiding the Corrective Deeds and MJR Security
Deed under the GUFTA, and declaring that its interest in the Properties
was superior to all claims. Rowland and the Rowland Affiliates filed a
motion to dismiss alleging: YPL lacked standing under the GUFTA;
failed to state a claim against the Rowland Affiliates; the claim was timebarred; and YPL was not an "interested party" with standing to seek a
declaratory judgment. The trial court dismissed the case. YPL
appealed.121

The GUFTA provides that transfers made by a debtor with the "actual
intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor" may be set aside. 122 In
determining the debtor's intent, consideration is given to whether the
"badges of fraud" are shown. 123 YPL alleged that the badges of fraud
present in this case included that the transfers were made to insiders,
were made after the date of the judgment, conveyed substantially all of
Rowland's assets, were made without consideration, and were made to
make Rowland insolvent. YPL also alleged that the Rowland Affiliates
knew, or should have known, that the transfers were made to hinder,
delay, or defraud Rowland's creditors. 124
Rowland and the Rowland Affiliates argued that Georgia law prohibits
the assignment of a right of action arising out of fraud. 125 While that
premise is generally true, YPL argued that the transfers occurred at a
time when YPL owned the loan and guaranty and therefore, the injury
was committed directly against YPL. In response, Rowland and the
Rowland Affiliates argued that the conveyances occurred in 2003, and

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 716, 798 S.E.2d at 318-19.
at 716, 798 S.E.2d at 319.
at 717, 798 S.E.2d at 319.
(quoting O.C.G.A. § 18-2-74(a)(1) (2017)).
at 717-18, 798 S.E.2d at 319 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 18-2-74(b) (2017)).
at 718, 798 S.E.2d at 320.
at 719, 798 S.E.2d at 320; O.C.G.A. § 44-12-24 (2017).
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not after the date of the judgment against Rowland. 126 The court
determined that the question of whether the GUFTA could apply turned
on the validity of the 2003 conveyances, which the court determined was
a question of fact. 127 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial
court on this issue since it found that it could not say that YPL lacked
standing to pursue its GUFTA claim based on its status of an assignee of
the debt. 128
The Rowland Affiliates, nonetheless, claimed that YPL failed to state
a claim as to the Rowland Affiliates since the GUFTA only applies to the
debtor and any recipients of transfers made by the debtor. The court of
appeals agreed, noting that none of the Rowland Affiliates received any
interest from Rowland, and that the GUFTA did not apply to them. 129
Rowland and the Rowland Affiliates also took the position the statute
of limitations had run on any claims for fraud asserted by YPL, and the
trial court agreed. 130 Since the four-year period began in 2003, and the
one-year discovery period began on the date the Corrective Deeds were
filed, September 2012 at the latest, the claims raised by YPL in August
2015 were time-barred.131 The court of appeals, however, determined that
there was insufficient evidence to show that the 2003 deeds were in fact
executed in 2003 (since they lacked a month and date). 132 Moreover, there
was no foundation laid to introduce the 2003 deeds into the evidence, and
as such, Rowland and the Rowland Affiliates had not yet proved that title
had passed as a result of the 2003 deeds. 133 In addition, the court held
that questions regarding due diligence in discovering an alleged fraud
are generally questions of fact. 134 As such, the trial court erred in
dismissing on statute of limitations grounds. 135
Likewise, the court held that the trial court erred in dismissing YPL's
action for a declaratory judgment and that YPL's interest in the
Properties is superior to any other interest held by MJR Financial, the
holder of the secured interest conveyed by Rowland Partners, LP that it
126. RES-GA YPL, LLC, 340 Ga. App. at 719, 798 S.E.2d at 321.
127. Id. at 720, 798 S.E.2d at 321.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 720-21, 798 S.E.2d at 321.
130. O.C.G.A. § 18-2-79 (2017) (providing that a claim challenging a transfer as
fraudulent must be brought within four years of the date of the transfer unless the transfer
was made with an actual intent to defraud a creditor. In that event, a claim must be brought
within one year after the transfer could have reasonably been discovered).
131. RES-GA YPL, LLC, 340 Ga. App. at 721, 798 S.E.2d at 322.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
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had acquired from Rowland and his sister. 136 The court reasoned that
since the declaratory judgment statutes are designed to provide relief
"from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, [or] other
legal relations,"137 and since YPL's claimed interest in the Properties had
not yet been determined due to the remaining questions of fact, the trial
court should not have dismissed the declaratory judgment claims. 138
IV. SALE OF REAL PROPERTY AND REAL ESTATE CONTRACTS 139

In Development Authority of Columbus v. Four JS Family, LLLP,140
the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed an order issuing a preliminary
injunction enjoining a sale by the Development Authority of Columbus
(DAC) and denying the DAC's motion to dismiss against Four JS Family,
LLLP (Four JS), holding that, because the sales contract did not fall
under the Development Authorities Law, 141 the DAC was permitted to
sell property at less than fair market value.14 2 The DAC agreed to sell a
1.75-acre tract of commercial property to Vision Hospitality Group, Inc.
(Vision Hospitality). The property adjoined a hotel, which was owned by
Four JS. DAC sought to build a hotel on the property, but agreed to sell
the property to Vision Hospitality for $50,000.143
After executing the agreement, Four JS filed a petition for injunction
and a temporary restraining order to enjoin the agreement between the
DAC and Vision Hospitality. Specifically, Four JS alleged that the DAC
violated the Development Authorities Act by agreeing to sell the property
at less than fair market value, which was estimated to be $3 million. 144
Four JS asserted that O.C.G.A. § 36-62-6(a)1 45 sets forth mandatory
requirements to allow a development authority to sell real property for
less than the fair market value, including that such a sale can only be
made to the state and a determination must be made that the property
can no longer be used as a project for a development of "trade, commerce,

136. Id. at 722, 798 S.E.2d at 322.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 722, 798 S.E.2d at 322-23.
139. This section was authored by Alexander F. Koskey, III, Associate in the firm of
Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Samford
University (B.S., 2004); Cumberland School of Law, Samford University (J.D., 2007).
Member, State Bars of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama.
140. 340 Ga. App. 474, 798 S.E.2d 15 (2017).
141. O.C.G.A. § 36-62-6 (2017).
142. Dev. Auth. of Columbus, 340 Ga. App. at 474-75, 798 S.E.2d at 15-16.
143. Id. at 475, 798 S.E.2d at 16.
144. Id.
145. O.C.G.A. § 36-62-6(a) (2017).
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industry, and employment opportunities."148 The trial court issued an
injunction preventing the closing of the sale between the DAC and Vision
Hospitality. The DAC filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that Four JS's
claims were without merit as the DAC was not prohibited under O.C.G.A.
§ 36-62-6 from selling the property at less than fair market value. The
trial court denied DAC's motion to dismiss finding that O.C.G.A.
§ 36-62-6 did not provide for the sale at less than fair market value but
for the exceptions listed in subsection (a). The appeal followed. 147
The court of appeals examined the statute and noted that the purpose
of the Development Authorities Law was "to develop and promote trade,
commerce, industry, and employment opportunities for the public good
and the general welfare and to promote the general welfare of the
state." 148 The court determined that the plain language of the act refuted
Four JS's contention that O.C.G.A. § 36-62-6 provided for two separate
types of sales of real property: those for fair market value and those for
less than fair market value, but possess a declaration that the property
can no longer be used advantageously. 149 Instead, the court determined
that O.C.G.A. § 36-62-6(a)(7) 15 0 and O.C.G.A. § 36-62-6(a)(7.1), 15 1 read
together, allow a development authority to sell property at fair market
value to any purchaser or for less than fair market value to the state but,
in both cases, "only when 'the board of directors of the authority .

.

. shall

determine that such real property can no longer be used advantageously
as a project for the development of trade, commerce, industry, and
employment opportunities."' 152 The court of appeals determined that
because the sale was for a project under the act, and there was no
determination that the property cannot be used as a project, then the sale
is not subject to O.C.G.A. § 36-62-6(a)(7) or (7.1).153 Accordingly, the court
held that the trial court erred in denying DAC's motion to dismiss and by
granting Four JS a preliminary injunction.154
In Liberty Capital, LLC v. First ChathamBank,155 the court of appeals
addressed the issue of specific performance related to a loan purchase
146. Dev. Auth. of Columbus, 340 Ga. App. at 476, 798 S.E.2d at 16 (quoting O.C.G.A.

§ 36-62-6(a)(7.1) (2017)).
147. Id. at 476-77, 798 S.E.2d at 17.
148. Id. at 477, 798 S.E.2d at 17 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-62-9 (2017)).
149. Id. at 478, 798 S.E.2d at 18 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36 -62-6(a)(7.1) (2017)).
150. O.C.G.A. § 36-62-6(a)(7) (2017).
151. O.C.G.A. § 36-62-6(a)(7.1) (2017).
152. Dev. Auth. of Columbus, 340 Ga. App at 478-79, 798 S.E.2d at 18 (quoting O.C.G.A.
§ 36-62-6(a) (7-7.1)).
153. Id. at 479, 798 S.E.2d at 18.
154. Id. at 479, 798 S.E.2d at 18-19.
155. 338 Ga. App. 48, 789 S.E.2d 303 (2016).
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agreement. 15 6 In 2007, Best Custom Homes (Best Homes) entered an
agreement to buy four lots in a development owned by an affiliate of
Liberty Capital, LLC (Liberty Capital). As an inducement for First
Chatham Bank (First Chatham) to loan money to Best Homes for the
purchase, Liberty Capital issued a commitment letter to First Chatham
stating that Liberty Capital would purchase the loan from First Chatham
if residences on the lots were not completed within a certain time period.
First Chatham agreed to issue the loan to Best Homes. 157
In 2010, First Chatham demanded that Liberty Capital purchase the
loan to Best Homes due to the failure to satisfy the time requirements of
the commitment letter. Liberty Capital refused to honor the demand, and
in 2011, First Chatham filed a lawsuit for specific performance, breach
of contract, and negligent misrepresentation. First Chatham moved for
summary judgment on the specific performance claim, which was denied
due to genuine issues of material fact as to the terms of the agreement
between the parties. An interlocutory appeal by First Chatham followed
where the appellate court affirmed the denial of summary judgment.
After the court remanded the case back to the trial court, the parties
entered into a consent order reforming the terms of the commitment
letter. First Chatham filed a renewed motion for summary judgment on
its specific performance claim, which was granted. 158
Liberty Capital filed an appeal contending that summary judgment
was improper on First Chatham's specific performance claim because it
failed to establish that it did not have an adequate remedy at law. First,
Chatham argued that specific performance was proper as its damages
were impossible to calculate and it could not be provided with adequate
compensation for non-performance.159 The court of appeals determined
that there was no underlying breach, which made it impossible to
calculate legal damages.160 Instead, the court of appeals found that
Liberty Capital's failure to purchase the loan is the breach sued upon,
but not the agreed upon remedy. 161 The court held that Liberty Capital's
failure to purchase the loan constituted a breach of contract that, if
proven, would entitle First Chatham to pursue money damages rather
than specific performance. 162 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed

156. Id. at 48, 789 S.E.2d at 304.
157. Id. at 49, 798 S.E.2d at 305.
158. Id. at 50, 789 S.E.2d at 305-06.
159. Id. at 50-51, 789 S.E.2d at 306.
160. Id. at 53, 789 S.E.2d at 308.
161. Id. at 52-53, 789 S.E.2d at 307.
162. Id. at 53, 789 S.E.2d at 307-08 (quoting Bennett v. Associated Food Stores, 118 Ga.
App. 711, 715, 165 S.E.2d 581, 585 (1968)).
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the trial court's order granting summary judgment to First Chatham on
its specific performance claim.1 63
V. EASEMENTS, COVENANTS, AND BOUNDARIES' 64

Some of the most heated battles between neighbors relate to the use
and boundaries of real property. Accordingly, this section focuses on
easements, covenants, and boundaries and how Georgia courts deal with
these property rights. Easements and declarations of covenants are both
viewed as contracts, and courts apply the usual rules of contract
construction in interpreting both types of documents. On the other hand,
actions to establish boundary lines between properties require a factual
determination.
Two issues that commonly arise with easements are the determination
of where the easement is located and its respective size. In Morris v.
Byrd,1 65 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed these very issues. On
appeal from summary judgment, the court held that the trial court erred
in granting Byrd an express easement over Morris's land. 166 The trial
court relied on the language in the deed given to Byrd by Morris's father
to prove the express easement. Ultimately, the trial court held that
because the road was identifiable, had been used since the 1930s, and
was known to both parties, the express easement was identifiable and
given a certain width. 167 However, the court of appeals reversed based on
the trial court's use of extrinsic evidence to determine the location and
width of the easement "because the general and unspecific language in
the deed provide[d] no key from which the location of the easement could
be determined."168

In R.C. Acres, Inc. v. Mommies Properties,LLC,169 the court of appeals
addressed "whether the trial court amended the judgment to specify the
ultimate location of the easement in a manner that conformed to the
jury's verdict and the evidence presented at trial." 170 The court of appeals

163. Id. at 53, 789 S.E.2d at 308.
164. This section was authored by Sabrina Lynn Atkins, Associate in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia College & State
University (B.A., 2010); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2013). Member, State and
Federal Bars of Georgia, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
165. 338 Ga. App. 540, 790 S.E.2d 556 (2016).
166. Id. at 540, 790 S.E.2d at 557.

167. Id.
168.
169.
170.

Id. at 541, 790 S.E.2d at 558.
338 Ga. App. 569, 790 S.E.2d 824 (2016).
Id. at 569, 790 S.E.2d at 824.
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determined that it did not.1 71 Interestingly, this was this case's second
appearance on appeal involving the location of R.C. Acres, Inc.'s (R.C.)
ingress and egress easement over Mommies Properties, LLC
(Mommies). 172
Due to a division of a large parcel of property that previously connected
to a nearby highway, R.C. owned a lot that became landlocked. Mommies
owned the portion of the divided lot with access to the nearby highway.
Upon the sale of the divided parcel to R.C., the predecessor in interest of
Mommies granted a "sixty foot wide easement which runs parallel to the
south boundary line" of the property to R.C. without explicit detail, the
deed only stated that "a relocated easement of ingress and egress will be
obtained between the parties . . . subsequent to the date of this

conveyance."17 However, at trial, Mommies contended that the easement
was never relocated. R.C. disagreed and pointed to surveys, deeds, and
testimony showing the easement was relocated to a roadway known as
"Woods Road." Upon purchasing its property in 2005, Mommies blocked
access to R.C.'s property and informed R.C. by email that it could no
longer use Woods Road for ingress and egress.1 74
Upon receiving this email, R.C. filed a complaint seeking to quiet title
to the easement. The court bifurcated the trial with the first half
addressing the original and final locations of the easement and the
second portion addressing damages. With respect to the first phase of
trial, the trial court instructed the jury to draw the original and final
locations of the easement on a redacted plat. R.C. objected to this
instruction and requested that the jury be given a limited number of
options to choose from; this objection and contemporaneous suggestion
were overruled.17 5 As a result, the jury returned a special verdict form
showing an original location as "parallel to the southern boundary" of the
property that was relocated in 2008.176
R.C. appealed, arguing that the description provided by the jury did
not adequately describe the final location of the easement, and thus,
prevented R.C. from obtaining marketable title. The court of appeals
vacated the judgment with respect to the final location of the easement
and remanded with the direction that "the trial court amend the

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
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569, 790 S.E.2d at 824-25.
569, 790 S.E.2d at 824.
570, 790 S.E.2d at 825.
570-01, 790 S.E.2d at 825.
572, 790 S.E.2d at 826.
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judgment to conform to the jury's verdict and the evidence, to make the
description of the easement sufficiently certain."177
On remand, R.C. requested that a land surveyor be appointed to
prepare a proper legal description of the final location of the easement.
However, the trial court failed to incorporate the surveyor's legal
description, and instead, instructed the surveyor to create a legal
description based on the jurors' hand-drawn easement lines rather than
the physical location of the road. Again, R.C.'s objections were overruled,
and the trial court issued a judgment which omitted a portion of the road
from the easement. As a result, R.C. once again appealed, arguing that
the jury clearly intended for the easement to include the entire road,
rather than merely a portion of it.178 On appeal, the court of appeals
decided in favor of R.C., holding that, for the amended judgment to
conform to the jury's verdict, the entire road "had to fall within the
boundaries of the plotted easement." 179 The court of appeals went on to
state that a judgment must conform "to the reasonable intendment of the
verdict and evidence presented at trial."so
With respect to covenants relating to real property, the court of
appeals recently took up the issue of whether a landowner, who had
previously quitclaimed land to another individual, was liable for
outstanding homeowner's association fees, fines, and assessments.181 In
Patel v. Kensington Community Ass'n, 1 82 Patel argued that she was not
liable for outstanding association assessments, fines, and other charges
between January 21, 2011 and January 7, 2014, because she had
previously transferred the property, via quitclaim deed, to another
individual and was no longer the owner. 183 Relying on Kensington's
recorded Declaration of Protective Covenants (the Declaration), the court
noted that the Declaration defined "Owner" to be the "record owner." 184
While Patel was correct in that she had transferred the property to
someone else on July 18, 2011, the quitclaim deed was not properly
recorded until June 26, 2014.185 Accordingly, because Patel failed to
record the quitclaim deed reflecting her transfer of title, she remained

177. Id. at 573, 790 S.E.2d at 827 (quoting R.C. Acres, Inc. v. Cambridge Faire Props.,
LLC, 331 Ga. App. 762, 770, 771 S.E.2d 444, 451 (2015)).
178. Id. at 572, 790 S.E.2d at 826.
179. Id. at 576, 790 S.E.2d at 829.
180. Id. at 579, 790 S.E.2d at 831.
181. 340 Ga. App. 896, 797 S.E.2d 235 (2017).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 897-98, 797 S.E.2d at 237.
184. Id. at 897, 797 S.E.2d at 237.
185. Id. at 897-98, 797 S.E.2d at 237.

2017]

REAL PROPERTY

273

record owner of the Property until June 26, 2014. Therefore, Patel was
subject to the Association's Complaint relating to outstanding
assessments.186

In Northside Bank v. Mountainbrook of Bartow County Homeowners
Ass'n,187 the court of appeals held that a Declaration of Covenants (the
Declaration) is not evidence of indebtedness, as required by O.C.G.A.
§ 13-1-11,188 and therefore does not limit the amount of attorney's fees
that can be recovered. 189 On appeal, Northside contended that the trial
court's calculation of attorney's fees was incorrect because it failed to
apply the limitations outlined in O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11.190 "The general rule
is that expenses of litigation, including attorney fees, are not recoverable
by a litigant against the opposite party except in those cases which are
specifically provided for by contract or by statute." 191
However, the court noted that the Declaration specifically provided for
attorney's fees by stating that Article VI, Section 1 provides: "Each such
assessment, together with the interest thereon and costs of collection
thereof, including reasonable attorney[] fees, shall . . . be the personal
obligation of the . . . Owner."1 92 Moreover, Article VI, Section 8 of the
Declaration also provided that "in an action to collect delinquent
assessments, 'interest, cost and reasonable attorney[] fees of any such
193
action shall be added to the amount of such assessment."'
The court reasoned that:
OCGA § 13-1-11 does not apply in this case because the Declaration is
not an evidence of indebtedness as contemplated by the statute.
"'[E]vidence of indebtedness,' as used in OCGA § 13-1-11, has reference
to any printed or written instrument, signed or otherwise executed by
the obligor(s), which evidences on its face a legally enforceable
194
obligation to pay money."

The court distinguished the Declaration from typical evidence of
indebtedness by noting that the Declaration only evinces an obligation
that may arise, rather than one that already exists and is evidenced by a
186. Id. at 898, 797 S.E.2d at 237.
187. 338 Ga. App. 126, 789 S.E.2d 378 (2016).
188. O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 (2017).
189. Northside, 338 Ga. App. at 126, 129, 789 S.E.2d at 380, 382.
190. Id. at 126, 789 S.E.2d at 380.
191. Id. at 128, 789 S.E.2d at 382 (alteration in original) (quoting Hickman v. Frazier,
128 Ga. App. 552, 552, 197 S.E.2d 441, 441(1973)).
192. Id. at 128-29, 789 S.E.2d at 382 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
193. Id. at 129, 789 S.E.2d at 382 (alteration in original).
194. Id. at 129-30, 789 S.E.2d at 382-83 (quoting Radioshack Corp. v. Cascade Crossing
II, LLC, 282 Ga. 841, 846, 653 S.E.2d 680, 684 (2007) (citation omitted)).
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written agreement. 195 Accordingly, the court affirmed the trial court
finding that O.C.G.A. § 13-1-11 should not apply. 196
VI. TRESPASS AND NUISANCE1 9 7
"Trespass and nuisance are related doctrines that protect interests in
the exclusive possession and use and enjoyment of land."198 The courts,
heeding the importance of protecting such interests, routinely clarify the
rights of owners and those claiming ownership.19 9
In Stroud v. Hall County,200 David Stroud acted as trustee of the Roy
Don Stroud Revocable Living Trust, and Mike Stroud was the trustee of
the Myrtle Jean Stroud Revocable Living Trust (the Strouds). The
Strouds brought suit against Hall County, Georgia, claiming county road
maintenance caused flooding and damage to their property. The court
granted summary judgment to the County, finding that the Strouds could
not prove causation, did not prove damages, and their claims were barred
by the statute of limitations. 201 The Strouds appealed, challenging the
trial court's finding and arguing that the court did not address their
inverse condemnation claim to the extent it was based on a claim of
trespass. 202 The court of appeals reversed in part as to the trial court's
reasoning for granting summary judgment and affirmed to the extent
that the Strouds claimed the road caused the flooding. 203
The evidence showed the County owned and maintained the road
running alongside the property. The Strouds testified that when the
property was initially purchased, its elevation was higher than the road
so that water flowed off the property and over the road. In the 1980s, the
Strouds noticed that water would pond in the yard. The ponding
increased over time. The Strouds alleged that the County's maintenance
of the road changed its elevation, thus creating the pooling. In 2013, the
Strouds attempted to mitigate the flow of water by building a ten-foot
wall. The wall was ineffective and the Strouds alleged that removal of
195. Id. at 130, 789 S.E.2d at 383.
196. Id. at 131, 789 S.E.2d at 383.
197. This section was authored by Linda S. Finley, Shareholder in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Mercer University (BA.,
1978); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 1981). Member State and Federal Bars of
Georgia and Florida, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme
Court.
198. Finley, supranote 1, at 231.
199. Id.
200. 339 Ga. App. 37, 793 S.E.2d 104 (2016).
201. Id. at 37, 793 S.E.2d at 106.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 38, 793 S.E.2d at 106.
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vegetation from their property resulted in erosion. 204 The Strouds argued
that the County's road maintenance diminished the value of the property
based upon an estimate from a landscaping company that repair to halt
the water flow would cost over $26,000. The Strouds also alleged that the
value of the property taken was at least $10,000 and that the vegetation
and trees removed by the County had a value of $10,500.205
Don Stroud testified that he first notified the County of the flooding in
the early 1960s and, thereafter, periodically complained. In 2013, a
county engineer gave the board of county commissioners four options to
ameliorate the problem, but the County failed to implement any repair.
Stroud brought suit against the County in 2014 alleging trespass,
nuisance, and inverse injunction. 206 In granting summary judgment to
the County, the trial court found: that there was no evidence that the
County raised the elevation of the road; that the landscaper's estimate
was improper hearsay; and that Strouds' testimony as to the value of the
property was not properly stated and, therefore, there was no evidence of
damages, a critical element of Strouds' allegations. 207 The trial court also
held that the statute of limitations had expired, barring the claim of
nuisance. 208
The court of appeals first addressed the issue of whether the County
caused the change of elevation to the road. 209 Causation is a necessary
element to claims of nuisance, trespass, and negligence. 210 Without
causation, summary judgment was proper. The trial court held that
Strouds' allegation as to the elevation change was unsupported.
However, Georgia case law permits witnesses, even if they are not
experts, to give opinions as to an increase in the flow of water onto a piece
of property. 211 The Strouds presented such evidence, which was sufficient
to establish causation in a nuisance case. 212
The court of appeals then addressed the element of damages. The court
determined that the failure to prove a specific amount of damages is not
sufficient to support summary judgment and that damages are
automatically inferred from the invasion of property rights. 213 Injury and

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 38-39, 793 S.E.2d at 106-07.
Id. at 39, 793 S.E.2d at 107.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39-40, 793 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 40, 793 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 40, 793 S.E.2d at 108.
Id.
Id. at 38, 793 S.E.2d at 107.
Id. at 41, 793 S.E.2d at 108-09.
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damages were inferred as soon as the Strouds' property rights were
invaded and, therefore, summary judgment was improper. 214
The court of appeals then considered whether the claims were barred
by the applicable statute of limitations. 215 O.C.G.A. § 9-3-30(a) 216 requires
that actions for trespass be brought within four years, 217 but nuisance
actions can be continuing and not subject to a limitation. 218 Permanent
nuisances continue to be a nuisance until the original act that created
the nuisance is complete. 219 Permanent nuisances have a clear date from
which the statute of limitations commences; that is, it commences at the
time the act stops.220 Continuing nuisances, as the term implies,
continue, and every continuance represents a renewal of the statute of
limitations. 221
Georgia courts have long held that improper maintenance of drainage
systems, which cause flooding, are continuing nuisances. 222 The same
principal applies to grading that results in flooding and dirt flow onto an
adjacent property. 223 Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the
nuisance could be viewed as either permanent or continuing and,
therefore, summary judgment on grounds that the statute of limitations
had expired was improper. 224
The Strouds also contended that the trial court failed to address their
inverse condemnation claim to the extent that the claim could have been
made on the basis of trespass, as opposed to nuisance. 225 The court of
appeals agreed that the trial court failed to address the claim under a
trespass theory, but explained that Georgia courts held that nuisance
and trespass claims based on water incursions are treated
synonymously. 226 Even though the trial court granted summary
judgment on the inverse condemnation claim based on nuisance, the
court would have come to the same conclusion under a trespass theory. 227
The court of appeals, therefore, reversed the trial court's grant of
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 42, 793 S.E.2d at 109.
Id.
O.C.G.A.

§ 9-3-30(a)

(2017).

Id.
Stroud, 339 Ga. App. at 42, 793 S.E.2d at 109.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 42, 793 S.E.2d at 109.
Id. at 42-43, 793 S.E.2d 109.
Id. at 43, 793 S.E.2d 109.
Id. at 43, 793 S.E.2d 110.
Id. at 44, 793 S.E.2d at 110.
Id.
Id. at 44, 793 S.E.2d at 110-11.
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summary judgment to the County on all three bases, but affirmed the
trial court as to the inverse condemnation claim under a nuisance, rather
than a trespass, theory. 228
Terry v. Catherall229 is another case where damage was caused by
runoff water. Terry brought suit against two neighboring property
owners, the Smiths and the Catheralls, alleging damages caused by
water runoff from their properties. The Smiths constructed an addition
to their home and added a paved parking pad and patio area which Terry
alleged caused concentrated rainwater to flow onto his property from a
pipe embedded in the Smiths' parking pad and from the patio roof. 230
Collected rainwater came out of two pipes near the Catherall's parking
pad "like a firehose" during heavy rains and flowed off the new
construction over a neighbor's property and onto Terry's property. 231
Terry alleged that the volume and concentration of the water flow, caused
by the improvements, resulted in damage to his property. 232
The trial court granted summary judgment to Catherall and Smith,
finding that the expert witness who testified on Terry's behalf failed to
provide sufficient quantifiable data to support his conclusion because he
merely calculated the new impervious surface area and speculated that
it increased the water flow without measuring volume or flow rates. On
this basis, the court found that the expert's opinion was speculation and
conjecture and was insufficient to prove that the defendant's
improvements caused the damages. 233
The court of appeals reversed, observing that the owner of property at
lower elevations has a duty to the higher, adjacent owners to accept water
runoff in its natural state. 234 However, if the owner of the adjacent,
higher positioned lot artificially alters or increases the flow of water, a
cause of action may lie for nuisance. 235 The expert witness presented
sufficient evidence that the defendants' improvements made the land less
pervious to water, increasing the amount and concentration of runoff
onto Terry's land, raising a question of fact to present to a jury. 236 Any

228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. at 45, 793 S.E.2d at 111.
337 Ga. App. 902, 789 S.E.2d 218 (2016).
Id. at 903, 789 S.E.2d at 220.
Id.
Id. at 905, 789 S.E.2d at 221.
Id. at 904, 789 S.E.2d at 221.
Id. at 905, 789 S.E.2d at 221.
Id.
Id. at 906, 789 S.E.2d at 222.
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shortcomings in the testimony went merely to the weight and not the
admissibility of the testimony. 237
In Toyo Tire North America Manufacturing, Inc. v. Davis,238 the
evidence showed that, in 2004, Toyo Tire constructed a tire
manufacturing and distribution center about 625 feet from the home of
Lynn and Duron Davis. Thereafter, the facility underwent three
expansions resulting in an increase in the number of employees to over
1000 and the number of tires produced per day to 13,500, with more
expansion planned. The Davises sued Toyo Tire seeking damages for
trespass and nuisance contending that the noise, lights, and odor from
its 24-hour-a-day operation, and the buildup of carbon black dust caused
by the manufacturing diminished the value of the Davises' property. A
real estate expert testified on behalf of the Davises that the property
value was significantly diminished because of the nuisance created by
Toyo Tire. 239

Toyo Tire filed a motion for summary judgment which was denied by
the trial court which certified the order for immediate review. 240 The
court of appeals in a divided seven-judge opinion affirmed the trial court's
order and, thereafter, the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to
address two issues: (1) whether an issue of fact existed as to whether
Toyo Tire's activities caused a loss in value to the property; and, (2)
whether the Davises could recover for both diminished property value
and personal discomfort and annoyance. 241
The supreme court held that, while there were some deficiencies as to
the methodology used by the Davises' expert, Toyo Tire's failure to object
to its admissibility precluded review of that issue. 242 Despite its
deficiencies, the expert opinion established facts to create an issue for
trial as to whether the operations of Toyo Tire caused a decrease in the
value of the Davises' property. 243 On this basis, the supreme court
affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment to Toyo Tire on the
issue of causation. 244

237. Id.
238. 299 Ga. 155, 787 S.E.2d 171 (2016). For a detailed discussion of the Georgia Court
of Appeals' decision in Toyo Tire North America Manufacturing, Inc. v. Davis, 333 Ga. App.
211, 775 S.E.2d 796 (2015), see Finley, supra note 1, at 272.
239. Toyo Tire N. Am. Mfg, Inc., 299 Ga. at 155-57, 787 S.E,2d at 174.
240. Id. at 157, 787 S.E.2d at 174.
241. Id.
242. Id. at 159, 787 S.E.2d at 176.
243. Id. at 162, 787 S.E.2d at 178.
244. Id.
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Overruling Stanfield v. Waste Management of Georgia, Inc., 245 the
supreme court also affirmed the trial court's denial of summary judgment
on the issue of double recovery and confirmed a long line of cases holding
that a property owner injured by a nuisance may recover both the
diminished value of the property and damages for the discomfort and
annoyance caused by the nuisance. 24 6 Observing that Stanfield
inexplicably departed from this line of cases, the supreme court affirmed
that separate injuries permit separate recoveries and, in this case, the
Davises experienced two separate injuries. 247 Damages for their
discomfort and annoyance compensated the Davises for injuries they
suffered in the past, while damages for the diminished property value
compensated them for the injuries they would suffer in the future due to
the continuing nature of the nuisance and trespass. 248
VII.

2 49
FORECLOSURE OF REAL PROPERTY

The Georgia courts again largely turned their attention to issues
arising from the confirmation of nonjudicial foreclosure sales pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-160250 in 2017.
First, the Georgia Supreme Court took the opportunity to answer
additional questions arising after a Georgia Court of Appeals decision in
2013 allowed guarantors the ability to contractually waive the protection
of the confirmation requirement. 251 In York v. RES-GA LJY, LLC,252 a
commercial lender foreclosed on properties on which the lender held
personal guarantees. 253 The lender filed confirmation actions, but in each
the trial court refused to confirm the respective sales. 25 4 Following the
decision in HWA Properties,Inc. v. Community & Southern Bank,255 the
lender then filed deficiency actions. The personal guarantees contained
provisions waiving "defenses based on suretyship or impairment of

245. 287 Ga. App. 810, 652 S.E.2d 815 (2007).
246. Toyo Tire N. Am. Mfg., 299 Ga. at 163, 787 S.E.2d at 178-79.
247. Id. at 164-65, 787 S.E.2d at 179.
248. Id. at 165, 787 S.E.2d at 179.
249. This section was authored by Dylan W. Howard, Shareholder in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Yale University (B.A.,
1999); University of Georgia Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2002). Member, State Bar of
Georgia, Northern and Middle Districts of Georgia, Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
250. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-160 (2017).
251. HWA Props., Inc. v. Cmty. & S. Bank, 322 Ga. App. 877, 886-87, 746 S.E.2d 609,
616-17 (2013).
252. 300 Ga. 869, 799 S.E.2d 235 (2017).
253. Id. at 870, 799 S.E.2d at 237.
254. Id. at 871, 799 S.E.2d at 237.
255. 322 Ga. App. 877, 746 S.E.2d 609 (2013).
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collateral" and then included specific examples including defenses
related to "any 'one action' or 'anti-deficiency' law." 256 The guarantors
made several creative arguments. First, they argued that the waiver was
inapplicable since the confirmation requirement is not a defense based
on suretyship or impairment of collateral, and because the terms "one
action" or "anti-deficiency" are boilerplate provisions used in contracts in
other states and not express references to Georgia's confirmation
requirement. Second, the guarantors argued that the lender's decision to
attempt confirmation proved the parties' understanding that
confirmation was required. Finally, the guarantors argued that the
deficiency actions were impermissible collateral attacks on the prior
confirmation judgments. 257 The supreme court ultimately agreed with
the lender, denied each of these arguments in turn, and affirmed the
deficiency judgments at issue. 258
In Bryant v. Optima International, Inc., 259 the Georgia Court of

Appeals conducted an in-depth analysis of a borrower's allegation that
separate debts were inextricably intertwined such that a failure to
confirm a foreclosure sale on one barred the lender from suing to collect
on the others. 260 The borrower in this case obtained three separate loans
obtained over a six-year period for the purpose of financing his business
from two lending companies, both of which were operated out of the same
location by the same sole shareholder. One of the lenders foreclosed on
the latest mortgage loan and failed to confirm the foreclosure sale. The
borrower then filed suit against both lenders and their sole shareholder
seeking to set aside the foreclosure and asserting inter alia claims for
fraud and predatory lending. The lenders and their shareholder hired a
single lawyer who filed a joint answer to the complaint. After a trial court
decision granting summary judgment on all counts to the lenders, the
borrower appealed. 261
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting
summary judgment based on the doctrine that a failure to confirm a
foreclosure sale on one debt would bar a later personal recovery on any
other debt incurred by the same debtor, for the same purpose, secured by
the same property, and held by the same creditor. 262 The court of appeals
extended this doctrine to loans at issue made and held by different

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

York, 300 Ga. at 870, 799 S.E.2d at 237.
Id. at 873, 875-76, 799 S.E.2d at 239-41.
Id. at 877, 799 S.E.2d at 242.
339 Ga. App. 696, 792 S.E.2d 489 (2016).
Id. at 702, 792 S.E.2d at 494-95.
Id. at 696-700, 792 S.E.2d at 491-93.
Id. at 703, 707, 792 S.E.2d at 495, 497.
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corporations, relying on the alter ego theory. 263 Because the two corporate
lenders shared the same sole shareholder, corporate officers, business
address, were represented by the same attorney who filed a joint answer,
and acted in concert with regard to the history of two of the loans, the
court of appeals concluded that there was sufficient evidence to create an
issue of fact as to whether the corporations were alter egos of their sole
shareholder and, thus, that the loans made and held by each company
were inextricably intertwined. 264 The court of appeals then remanded the
case for trial on these issues.

265

In Nadel v. Branch Banking & Trust Co.,266 the Georgia Court of
Appeals reversed a trial court order denying guarantors' motion to set
aside a confirmation judgment on the basis that the lender had not
provided sufficient evidence that it effectively notified the guarantors of
the confirmation hearing. 267 The trial court issued an initial notice of
hearing and directed the lender to serve it.268 The lender personally
served both guarantors, one of which was served at a different address
than that specified on the affidavit of service. The initial hearing was
continued and the court issued a notice for a new hearing date. 269 The
court distribution list, included with the new notice, identified incorrect
addresses. Neither guarantor attended the hearing,.and the trial court
confirmed the sale in their absence. The guarantors then moved to set
aside the confirmation. The trial court denied the motion, finding that
they had received actual notice of the hearing and that there was no
defect apparent on the face of the record showing improper service. 270
Reversing the order, the Georgia Court of Appeals concluded that
notice of a confirmation hearing is mandatory and that notice by mail
could not be presumed unless the letter was written, properly addressed,
contained the correct postage, and duly mailed. 271 In response, the lender
relied on an affidavit by its attorney that showed a draft of a cover letter
was prepared and forwarded, and that notice "would have been finalized
and sent" to the-correct address. 272 Actual copies of the letters that were
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272.

Id. at 705-06, 792 S.E.2d at 497.
Id. at 706, 792 S.E.2d at 497.
Id. at 707, 792 S.E.2d at 497.
340 Ga. App. 213, 797 S.E.2d 140 (2017).
Id. at 213, 797 S.E.2d at 141.
Id. at 213-14, 797 S.E.2d at 142.
Id. at 214, 797 S.E.2d at 142.
Id. at 213-15, 797 S.E.2d at 142.
Id. at 215, 797 S.E.2d at 143.
Id. at 216, 797 S.E.2d at 143.
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sent were apparently lost.2 73 The court of appeals concluded that the
lender's evidence of mailing was speculative and unsupported by any
actual "evidence of proper mailing." 274 Finally, the court concluded that
the guarantors' actual knowledge of the confirmation hearing was
irrelevant. 275 Since Georgia's confirmation statute must be construed
strictly, the court refused to adopt reasoning that would amount to the
creation of a substantial compliance standard or harmless error
doctrine. 276
Turning to the wrongful foreclosure arena, in Wells FargoBank, N.A.
v. LaTouche,277 the court of appeals reversed an order by the trial court
denying the lender's motion for summary judgment. 278 The borrower
alleged that the lender violated Department of Veterans Affairs (VA)
regulations by, inter alia, allegedly failing to conduct a face-to-face
interview before foreclosing on the property. While the borrower
acknowledged that the VA regulations did not provide for a private right
of action, he alleged that the regulations were incorporated into the
security deed and, thus, could provide the basis for a breach-of-contract
claim. 279 The court of appeals ultimately sidestepped this issue.
Determining that the specific regulation at issue required a face-to-face
meeting only where the lender had not established contact with the
borrower, the court focused on the lender's evidence of a years-long
pattern of communication with the borrower including a loan
modification review. 280 Since there was ample evidence that the borrower
and lender communicated extensively prior to foreclosure, the lender was
not required to conduct a face-to-face meeting. 281 Thus, the court of
appeals concluded that the lender was entitled to summary judgment on
borrower's claims for breach of contract, wrongful foreclosure, and
surprise. 282
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Id.
Id. at 217, 797 S.E.2d at 144.
Id.
340 Ga. App. 515, 798 S.E.2d 54 (2017).
Id. at 515, 798 S.E.2d at 55.
Id. at 516-17, 798 S.E.2d at 56-57.
Id. at 520, 798 S.E.2d at 59.
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VIII. CONDEMNATION AND EMINENT DOMAIN 283

While the Georgia Appellate Courts issued several decisions in the
area of eminent domain, the decisions largely clarified existing law
concerning the consequential damages access takings, the right of a
utility company to seek compensation for a taking, and the duty of a
condemning authority to provide a summary of its estimate of just and
adequate compensation. 284
In Curry v. Department of Transportation2 8 5 the Georgia Department
of Transportation (the Department) condemned access rights to a
property owned by Christy Curry for the construction of a limited access
highway. 286 A jury awarded Curry $86,000 in compensation, and a
judgment was entered on the award. 287 Curry appealed, arguing that the
trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction that was not applicable to
the facts of the case and that was inaccurate as a matter of law. 288 The
Curry property was located at the intersection of Ga. Hwy. 257 and
Firetower Road. In conjunction with the construction of the Ga. Hwy. 441
bypass, the Department took all of Curry's rights of access to Firetower
Road. Approximately 1,313 feet of access rights were taken. 289
"[A] jury charge must 'be adjusted to the evidence, apt, and a correct
statement of the applicable law."' 290 The review of a jury charge is a legal
question, and the appellate court owes no deference to the trial court's
ruling as it applies the plain legal error standard of review. 291 The
relevant portion the charge in question concerned stated:
[A] property owner is not entitled to access at all points on the
boundary between his property and the public right of way, but is

entitled to convenient access. If the means of access are not
substantially interfered with[,] the property owner is not entitled to
283. This section was authored by Ivy N. Cadle, Shareholder in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., Macon, Georgia; Adjunct Professor of
Law, Mercer University School of Law, Macon, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.S., cum
laude, 2000; M.Acc., 2002; CPA, 2008); Mercer University School of Law (J.D., 2007).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
284. See Curry v. Dep't of Transp., 341 Ga. App. 482, 801 S.E.2d 95 (2017); Clayton Cty.
v. Ga. Power Co., 340 Ga. App. 60, 796 S.E.2d 16 (2017); Summerour v. City of Marietta,
338 Ga. App. 259, 788 S.E.2d 921 (2016).
285. 341 Ga. App. 482, 801 S.E.2d 95 (2017).
286. Id. at 482, 801 S.E.2d at 96.
287. Id. at 482-83, 801 S.E.2d at 96.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 483, 801 S.E.2d at 96.
290. Id. at 484, 801 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting Boston Men's Health Ctr. v. Howard, 311 Ga.
App. 217, 221, 715 S.E.2d 707, 707 (2011)).
291. Id.
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consequential damages for loss of access. The measure of damages is
any diminution to market value of the remaining property by reason
of such interference. Whether there has been a substantial
interference and any reduction in fair market value by reason of such
interference is for you to determine. 292
Curry objected to the charge, contending that this court previously
held this charge was reversible error in McDonald v. Department of
Transportation,293 a case involving nearly identical facts. 294 In McDonald
the Department condemned part of McDonald's access to construct a
limited access highway. 295 Prior to the condemnation, McDonald had
access to two county roads. 296 After the condemnation, McDonald had no
access to one of the county roads. 297 The court in McDonald charged as
follows:
A property owner has a right of access to his property from a public
street, and the owner cannot be deprived of his right of access without
just and adequate compensation being paid. However, a property
owner is not entitled to access to his land at all points on the boundary
between the property and all streets, if entire access has not been cut
off, and if he is offered a convenient access to his property, then his
means of entering and exiting the property have not been substantially
interfered with and the property owner cannot recover consequential
298
damages for the access to the property.
After holding the charge did not govern a situation where a property
owner loses all of its access to one street but retains access to another
street, the court of appeals determined the facts of Department of
30 0
Transportation v. Whitehead299 were more analogous to McDonald.
Whitehead had frontage on 19th Street and West Peachtree Street, but
retained access only to 19th Street after the condemnation. 30 1 In
Whitehead, the supreme court held that the right of access "to a public
road is a property right which arises from the ownership of land
contiguous to a public road," and the property owner cannot be deprived
292. Id. at 485, 801 S.E.2d at 97.
293. 247 Ga. App. 763, 544 S.E.2d 747 (2001).
294. Curry, 341 Ga. App. at 486, 801 S.E.2d at 98 (citing McDonald, 247 Ga. App. at
763, 544 S.E.2d at 748).
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. 253 Ga. 150, 317 S.E.2d 542 (1984).
300. Curry, 341 Ga. App. at 486, 801 S.E.2d at 98.
301. Id.
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of that right without being paid just and adequate compensation. 302 The
supreme court defined the right as an easement of access to ingress and
egress the abutting public road. 303 In Whitehead, the supreme court
further held that the Department deprived Whitehead of his easement of
access, so it was required to compensate Whitehead for that deprivation,
even if Whitehead was not using the right of access at the time of the
condemnation. 304 In determining the amount of compensation to award
Whitehead, the jury is to consider whether the owner has any alternative
access to determine the amount of damages due to the owner for the loss
of access. 305
Consequentially, the court of appeals held in McDonald that the jury
should have been instructed that McDonald's complete loss of access to
one of two county roads was a compensable taking and those damages, if
any, would be mitigated if there was continued access to the second
county road. 306
Curry argued that the facts in her case were nearly identical to those
in McDonald, and that the court should similarly hold the trial court's
jury instruction on consequential damages was erroneous and amounted
to reversible error.307 The court of appeals disagreed and held that, while
the facts at issue were similar to McDonald, the trial court's instruction
was not. 308 In reaching its holding, the court of appeals reasoned that
even though the subject instruction contained language from the
objectionable charge in McDonald, it also included the same language
employed by the supreme court in Whitehead.309 Therefore, the charge
given in the instant case properly explained that a condemnee must be
compensated for a loss of its right of access to a public road, but that right
to compensation must also be balanced with the possibility of mitigating
damages through alternative access to another public road.310 Because
Curry had alternative access, the court of appeals held that the charge
311
was appropriate and affirmed the judgment.
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305.
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308.
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Id. at 486-87, 801 S.E.2d at 98 (quoting Whitehead, 253 Ga. at 151, 317 S.E.2d at
Whitehead, 253 Ga. at 1M1-52, 317 S.E.2d at 544.
Id. at 152, 317 S.E.2d at 544.
Id.
Curry, 341 Ga. App. at 487, 801 S.E.2d at 98.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 488, 801 S.E.2d at 99.
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In Clayton County v. Georgia Power Co.,312 the court of appeals
considered whether Georgia Power Company (Georgia Power) was
entitled to compensation from Clayton County (the County) for the
expenses Georgia Power incurred in relocating electrical lines and
support structures (the Power Equipment) after the County condemned
property for a road expansion.3 13 To answer the question, the court of
appeals turned to the rules of contract construction as they concerned the
1929 Franchise Agreement (the Agreement) and the facts of the taking. 314
"In 1947 and 1950, Georgia Power acquired certain easements from
private property owners along .

.

. Stagecoach Road and Panola Road in

Clayton County." 315 The easements were acquired for the purpose of
installing and operating the Power Equipment. Stagecoach and Panola
Roads were constructed on an eighty-foot right-of-way that was acquired
by the County after Georgia Power acquired its easements. To widen
Panola Road, the County filed a Petition and Declaration of Taking (the
Petition) that acquired a portion of Georgia Power's easement area.
Georgia Power responded, claiming the Petition was unauthorized and
seeking compensation for the taking and damaging of its property.3 16
The County challenged Georgia Power's right to compensation,
claiming that the terms of the Agreement required Georgia Power to bear
the costs of removing and relocating the Power Equipment. Georgia
Power responded by arguing that the County was responsible for the
costs because the Agreement did not apply since the Power Equipment
was placed under the authority of private easements granted by private
property owners. The trial court ruled in favor of Georgia Power, and the
County appealed. 317
The court of appeals first noted that the statutory scheme generally
governing the costs of relocating the Power Equipment in connection with
a public road improvement requires the public utility to bear the costs. 318
However, that scheme also provides that no utility shall be deprived of a
property interest, or compensation in such an interest. 319 While the
County acknowledged that it would generally bear the costs of relocating
the Power Equipment, it argued that this case was controlled by the

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.

340 Ga. App. 60, 796 S.E.2d 16 (2017).
Id. at 60-61, 796 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 62-63, 796 S.E.2d at 18-19.
Id. at 60, 796 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 60-61, 796 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 61, 796 S.E.2d at 17.
Id. at 61, 796 S.E.2d at 17-18.
Id. at 61-62, 796 S.E.2d at 18.
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Agreement. 20 Supporting the County's argument was subsection (b) of
Paragraph 3 of the Agreement which reads:
In event of change in the grade or the width of any of the roads,
highways, streets or alleys by the County authorities, on, along, over
and across which any such transmission or distribution line or lines
may have been or may hereafter be erected, [Georgia Power] agrees,
at its own cost and expense and without any cost or expense to said
County, to move its transmission or distribution lines to such other
location on said roads, highways, streets or alleys as may be
321
designated by said County authorities.
Based on the language above, the County argued that the face of the
Agreement required Georgia Power to pay to relocate Power Equipment,
even if it is located on easements acquired before highway right-of-way
was acquired by the County. 322
Reviewing the decision of the trial court to allow Georgia Power to
recover compensation under a de novo standard, the court looked at the
relevant rules of contract construction. 323 The rules cited included
effectuating the intent of the parties as set forth in the contract and
upholding a contract in whole and in every part, but looking at the
entirety of the contract while arriving at the construction of any part.324
In construing the contract, the court first considered the fact that the
Agreement's purpose was explicit-to permit Georgia Power to erect,
operate, maintain, renew, and extend power lines over, along, and across
the public roads of the County. 325 Furthermore, the power lines would be
erected subject to the approval and supervision of the County authority
charged with layout, construction, and maintenance of the public
roads. 326 In subsection (b), the provision at issue, Georgia Power agreed
to bear the expense of moving "any such transmission or distribution line
or lines [which] may have been or may hereafter be erected." 327 The court
focused on the "any such" qualifier and held that Georgia Power's
obligation does not extend to any power line erected along a county road,
but only to "any such" power lines that may or may be erected in reference

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
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327.

Id. at 62, 796 S.E.2d at 18.
Id.
Id. at 63, 796 S.E.2d at 19.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 64, 796 S.E.2d at 19.
Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
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to subsection (a) concerning those lines that were erected with county
approval or county supervision. 328
By placing subsection (b) in the context of the Agreement as a whole,
the court held that subsection (b) would not apply to situations where
Georgia Power is forced by the County to relocate Power Equipment that
Georgia Power originally erected on non-County owned roads or right-ofway. 329 Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed. 330
In Summerour v. City of Marietta,331 the City of Marietta (the City)
filed a condemnation petition under the special master method to acquire
property owned by Ray Summerour. 332 On appeal, Summerour contended
that the condemnation petition should be dismissed because the City, as
required by O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9(3),333 neglected to provide him a summary
of the basis for its just-compensation offer. 334 Summerour also contended
the City negotiated in bad faith.33 5
Summerour owned property that was being used as a small grocery
store when the City acquired it as part of a project to expand a recreation
center. On June 10, 2010, the City sent Summerour a letter stating that
it would need to purchase his property and that it would make an offer
based on the appraisal of the property. On June 23, 2010, the City again
wrote Summerour saying the property appraised for $85,000 and offering
to purchase the property at that price. Summerour did not respond, and
the City wrote again on October 6, 2010. Summerour did not respond.
The City next wrote Summerour on May 23, 2013, and then again on
July 26, 2013. In the July 2013 correspondence, the City stated the
current appraised value was $95,000 for the property and $46,700 for the
grocery store. Accordingly, the City offered $141,700 to purchase the
grocery store and the property.336
On August 13, 2013, Summerour sent the City a letter (1) requesting
a summary of the appraisal, (2) informing the City he would be hiring his
own appraiser, and (3) stating he learned the City was considering an
acquisition using the power of eminent domain by attending city council
meetings. On December 4, 2013, Summerour sent the City another letter
offering to sell his property for $375,000. The City responded on

328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

Id.
Id.
Id.
338 Ga. App. 259, 788 S.E.2d 921 (2016).
Id. at 259, 788 S.E.2d at 922.
O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9(3) (2017).
Summerour, 338 Ga. App. at 259, 788 S.E.2d at 922.
Id.
Id. at 260, 788 S.E.2d at 922.
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December 10, 2013, and increased its offer to $152,000 while stating that
would be its highest offer unless it received a certified appraisal from
Summerour. Two days later, the City sent another letter reiterating its
offer of $152,000 and asking that Summerour respond by December 18,
2013.337

On December 17, 2013, Summerour hand delivered his rejection letter
to the City asking that the parties meet to discuss their differences. Over
the next few months, Summerour retained legal counsel and asked that
the City postpone further action until his appraiser made a
determination of value. The City complied and informal discussion
continued, mostly via email. On May 8, 2014, Summerour's counsel wrote
the City and complained that the City never produced copies of its
appraisals or a summary of the same, as required by O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9(3).
Shortly thereafter, the City delivered a summary of its appraisal to
Summerour, and the parties met for additional negotiations. On May 16,
2014, the City sent a letter to Summerour providing its full appraisal
report dated July 17, 2013, and offered to purchase the property for
$139,400. The parties continued to negotiate but did not reach an
agreement. On June 13, 2014, the City informed Summerour that it
would be purchasing his property and grocery store by condemnation. 338
On October 2, 2014, the City filed a condemnation petition and
Summerour answered, contesting the valuation and the taking. A special
master hearing was held and both parties presented evidence concerning
value. Summerour argued the petition should be dismissed because the
City failed to comply with O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9. The special master found
that the City complied with its obligations and set the fair market value
of the property at $225,000. Both parties filed exceptions and appealed
the rulings of the special master to the Cobb County Superior Court. The
trial court adopted the special master's findings and Summerour
obtained a certificate of immediate review which resulted in the instant
appeal. 339 In reviewing the record, the court applied the "any evidence"
standard to the factual findings below and the de novo standard to the
questions of law. 340

Summerour first contended the trial court erred in failing to dismiss
the City's petition because the City failed to comply with O.C.G.A.
§ 22-1-9(3).341 Tasked with interpreting the statute, the court noted that
it must afford the statutory text its "plain and ordinary meaning" and

337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

Id.
Id. at 260-61, 788 S.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 261-62, 788 S.E.2d at 923.
Id. at 263, 788 S.E.2d at 924.
Id.
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consider the text "in its most natural and reasonable way as an ordinary
speaker of the English language would."342 Turning to the plain text of
O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9, the court noted that the City is required to provide a
summary of its appraisal, but the term "summary" is not defined. 343
Turning to the plain meaning of the term, "summary," the court
determined that the term is most commonly understood as "'a statement
or account . . . containing or comprising the chief points or the sum and
substance of a matter' and 'characterized by or involving conciseness or
brevity.'" 344 Thus, the court determined that no summary was provided
until shortly after the May 8, 2014, settlement meeting and that the
sufficient summary provided at that time was "far too late" as
negotiations were initiated in 2010.345

As it concerns Summerour's contention that the City negotiated in bad
faith, the court vacated the trial court's ruling and remanded the case for
further proceedings to resolve the issue. 346 As part of its instruction, the
court noted that further proceedings must determine whether the
negotiations were conducted in a way that violates O.C.G.A.
§ 22-1-9(7).347
IX. ZONING

3 48

In Hoechstetter v. Pickens County, 349 the court of appeals reviewed
what notice is required prior to a hearing that ultimately results in a
zoning decision. Within the matter, property owners Doug and Lynda
Tatum (the Tatums) submitted a zoning request in August of 2015, to
which the Pickens County Planning Commission (the Board) held a
public hearing on or about October 15, 2015. Following the hearing, the
planning commission recommended that the Board grant the requested
permit with conditions. On January 7, 2016, the Board held a work
session, during which it considered the Tatums' request without taking
a vote. The Board then considered and granted the permit application at
its January 21, 2016, meeting. The only notice given prior to the Board's

342. Id. at 263-64, 788 S.E.2d at 924-25.
343. Id. at 265, 788 S.E.2d at 925-26.
344. Id. at 265, 788 S.E.2d at 926.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 267, 788 S.E.2d at 927.
347. O.C.G.A. § 22-1-9(7) (2017); Summerour, 338 Ga. App. at 268, 788 S.E.2d at 927.
348. This section was authored by Craig Nazzaro, Of Counsel (at time of authorship) in
the firm of Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia.
American University (B.A., 2000); Hofstra University School of Law (J.D., 2003). Member,
State Bars of New York and New Jersey.
349. 341 Ga. App. 213, 799 S.E.2d 352 (2017).
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January 21st meeting was a publication in the county's legal paper that
appeared the same day as the meeting. 350
"The plaintiffs, [and] all neighbors of the Tatums' property, appealed
the Board's decision to the Pickens County Superior Court, arguing that
the permit was invalid because the Board failed to provide sufficient
notice of the January 21 meeting under O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a)." 351 That
statute states:
A local government taking action resulting in a zoning decision shall
provide for a hearing on the proposed action. At least 15 but not more
than 45 days prior to the date of the hearing, the local government
shall cause to be published within a newspaper of general circulation
within the territorial boundaries of the local government a notice of
the hearing. The notice shall state the time, place, and purpose of the
hearing.352
"The trial court found that the notice provided was sufficient because
the planning commission hearing and Board meeting constituted a
353
'continuous course of a zoning matter."'
On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held:
A "zoning decision" means a "final legislative action by a local
government which results in ...

[t]he grant of a permit relating to a

special use of property." "Local government" includes any county, and
counties are authorized to set their own policies and procedures for
conducting hearings under the [Zoning Procedures Law (ZPL)]. A
failure to adhere to the notice requirements of O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a) 354
renders the zoning decision invalid. 355
However, the court went on to state,
[i]n analyzing notice and hearing requirements under the ZPL, the
Supreme Court of Georgia has interpreted the phrase 'taking action
resulting in a zoning decision' as set forth in O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a) to
mean the 'entire process of changing or adopting a zoning ordinance.'

350. Id. at 213-14, 799 S.E.2d at 352-53.
351. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a) (2017); Hoechstetter, 341 Ga. App. at 214, 799 S.E.2d at 353.
352. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a).
353. Hoechstetter, 341 Ga. App. at 214, 799 S.E.2d at 353.
354. O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a).
355. Hoechstetter, 341 Ga. App. at 214-15, 799 S.E.2d at 353 (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (quoting O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(4)(E) (2017); O.C.G.A. § 36-66-3(1) (2017);
O.C.G.A. §36-66-5(a) (2017)).
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Under this interpretation, a hearing is required at only one point
during the process but not at every stage.35 6
"[T]he Pickens County Planning Commission published notice of a
hearing after the Tatums filed their conditional use application . ."357
The court held that the:
entire process undoubtedly constituted a 'continuous course of a zoning
matter.' Under the relevant precedent, notice was not required at
every stage of the process. Moreover, the fact that the final vote did
not take place until three months after the hearing did not render the
otherwise sufficient notice invalid. 358
Therefore, the court concluded "that the trial court correctly found that
the notice given before the planning commission hearing was sufficient

under O.C.G.A. § 36-66-4(a)." 359
In City of Cumming v. Flowers,360 the supreme court defined, "the
procedure by which a local zoning board's quasi-judicial decision on a
variance request may be appealed to the superior court." 361 In the case,
"Kerley Family Homes, LLC ('Kerley') was granted a variance by the City
of Cumming's Board of Zoning Appeals ('BZA'). Neighboring homeowners
aggrieved by the variance sought to appeal the BZA's decision by filing a
complaint seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction in the superior
court." 362 The defendants argued that, under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1,363 "they
were entitled to summary judgment against the homeowners [as] the
zoning variance decision was a quasi-judicial decision that can be
challenged in the superior court only by a petition for certiorari." 364

356. Id. at 214-15, 799 S.E.2d at 353-54; see also City of Roswell v. Outdoor Systems,
274 Ga. 130, 131, 549 S.E.2d 90 (2001).
357. Hoechstetter, 341 Ga. App. at 215, 799 S.E.2d at 354.
358. Id. (quoting City of Cumming v. Realty Dev. Corp., 268 Ga. 461, 463, 491 S.E.2d
60, 63 (1997)).
359. Id. at 216, 799 S.E.2d at 354.
360. 300 Ga. 820, 797 S.E.2d 846 (2017).
361. Id. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 848.
362. Id.
363. O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 (2017).
(a) The writ of certiorari shall lie for the correction of errors committed by any
inferior judicatory or any person exercising judicial powers, including the judge
of the probate court, except in cases touching the probate of wills, granting
letters testamentary, and of administration.
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this Code section, the writ of certiorari
shall not lie in civil cases in the probate courts which are provided for by Article
6 of Chapter 9 of Title 15.
Id.
364. Flowers, 300 Ga. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 848.
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Kerley was in the process of building townhomes in Cumming, Georgia
that were in violation of the city's zoning ordinance that required each
building to, "be set back at least 20 feet from the adjoining property."3 65
As such, they filed an application requesting a variance for the setbacks
of certain lots under construction. 366
On May 21, 2015, neighboring homeowners (the Homeowners):
filed a complaint in Forsyth County Superior Court against the City,
the individual members of the city council, the Mayor, and the "City
Council [of Cumming Georgia] and/or Members of the Board of Zoning
Appeals"... as well as [Kerley].... The Homeowners sought to appeal
the grant of the variance . .. [through] a writ of mandamus to "compel
the Defendants Mayor and City Council and/or the board of zoning
appeals to comply with the law" as well as "an injunction restraining
and enjoining Defendants from violating the Zoning Ordinance."367

The "defendants argued that the Homeowners' complaint should be
dismissed because a challenge to the variance decision was required to
come to the superior court by a petition for certiorari under [Georgia
code]."368 The superior court ruled in favor of the Homeowners relying on
the procedural direction from the supreme court that "where the zoning
ordinance does not provide a means of appeal from the denial of a request
for a variance, the landowner travels to superior court by writ of
mandamus." 369 The defendants immediately filed an appeal, which was
transferred to the supreme court as the case involved an issue of
mandamus relief.370
In Jackson v. Spalding County,371 the supreme court turned its
attention to the precedent it previously established. 372 In Jackson, the
local zoning ordinance provided for certiorari. The dispositive issue in the
case was whether certiorari under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1373 was ever available
to challenge a zoning variance decision. 374 The court clearly held-for the
first time-that a zoning variance decision was quasi-judicial and, thus,
subject to certiorari review under O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1.375 However, the court
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.

Id. at 820, 797 S.E.2d at 849.
Id.
Id. at 821, 797 S.E.2d at 849.
Id. See O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1 (2017).
Flowers, 300 Ga. at 822, 797 S.E.2d at 850.
Id. at 822, 797 S.E.2d at 849.
265 Ga. 792, 462 S.E.2d 361 (1995).
Id. at 792-93, 462 S.E.2d at 363.
O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1.
Jackson, 265 Ga. at 792-94, 462 S.E.2d at 362-64.
Id.

294

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 69

in Jackson also stated, "'when the zoning ordinance fails to prescribe a
method of judicial review,' mandamus is the proper method to appeal a
variance decision," the court refers to this as the local-ordinance
requirement. 376 Neither party in this matter contested that the BZA
variance decision was quasi-judicial in nature, and the court agreed. 377
The court then turned its analysis to the aforementioned local-ordinance
requirement. 378
The court ultimately held that the local-ordinance requirement, held
in Jackson: (i) conflicted with O.C.G.A. § 5-4-1; (ii) was adopted without
apparent reflection since the court "was uncertain whether local zoning
decisions like variance decisions qualified as a decision 'by [an] inferior
judicatory or [a] person exercising judicial powers' under O.C.G.A.
§ 5-4-1"; and (iii) "that it allows local ordinances to effectively preempt
the general certiorari statute." 379 For these reasons, the court overturned
Jackson and reversed the trial court's ruling denying summary judgment
and allowing the Homeowners' claim for an injunction to proceed.380
X. TAXATION OF REAL PROPERTY 3 81

&

It has been a seminal year regarding tax sales because a long-running
question concerning entitlement to excess funds was finally resolved. In
Wester v. United Capital Financialof Atlanta, LLC,382 the Georgia Court
of Appeals ruled that a redeeming creditor had a first priority lien in
excess funds. 383 However, in 2015, the court of appeals did not follow its
prior decision, finding that a redeeming creditor was not entitled to
excess funds where it did not have an interest in the property at the time
of the tax sale. 384 In DLT List, LLC v. M7VEN Supportive Housing

376. Flowers, 300 Ga. at 822-23, 797 S.E.2d at 850 (quoting Jackson, 265 Ga. 792, 793,
462 S.E.2d 361, 363).
377. Id. at 823, 797 S.E.2d at 850.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 827, 829, 797 S.E.2d at 853-54.
380. Id. at 834, 797 S.E.2d at 857.
381. This section was authored by Jonathan E. Green, Shareholder in the firm of Baker,
Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, PC, Atlanta, Georgia. Vanderbilt University
(B.A., 1998); University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2001). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
382. 282 Ga. App. 392, 638 S.E.2d 779 (2006).
383. Id. at 392, 638 S.E.2d at 780.
384. DLT List, LLC v. M7VEN Supportive Hous. & Dev. Grp., 335 Ga. App. 318, 320,
323, 779 S.E.2d 436, 438, 440 (2015).
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Development Group,385 the Georgia Supreme Court resolved the conflict
between the two cases. 386
Critically, the redeeming creditor did not have an interest in the
property at the time of the tax sale. Although the property owner was the
only person entitled to the excess funds at the time of the sale, a creditor
redeemed the property and argued that the redemption entitled it to an
award of the excess funds.38 7 Accordingly, the supreme court determined
that the rule laid out in Wester was unworkable as it would render
uncertainty regarding the proper recipient of excess funds and force
counties to hold onto funds if the property might be redeemed.388
In making its decision, the supreme court looked not at case law but
at the clear language of the Georgia code. 389 The supreme court explained
that O.C.G.A. §§ 48-4-40390 and 48-4-43391 provide that a redeeming
creditor obtains a first lien in "the subject real property in the amount
expended to redeem the property" only; and once recorded, redemption
takes priority over any other claims to the property. 392 The supreme court
determined that, because O.C.G.A. § 48-4-43 only provides for a lien in
the real property, the lien granted to the redeeming creditor did not cover
the excess funds, which were deemed personal property. 393 The supreme
court's decision created a bright-line rule to apply to the party entitled to
excess funds at the time of the tax sale. 394 Furthermore, this decision
removed the potential uncertainty that would be created because a
property could be redeemed well after the date of the tax sale. 395
The supreme court also addressed the requirements for foreclosure of
the right of redemption. In Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLC,396
the supreme court established that three requirements of O.C.G.A.
§ 48-4-45(a) 397 must be satisfied before redemption is barred.398 The facts
in this case are simple. On August 6, 2013, certain property was sold at
a tax sale. On August 15, 2014, the tax deed purchaser sent a Notice of
385.
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301 Ga. 131, 800 S.E.2d 362 (2017).
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Id. at 134, 800 S.E.2d at 364.
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DLT List, 301 Ga. at 134, 800 S.E.2d at 365.
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Id. at 136, 800 S.E.2d at 366.
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299 Ga. 891, 792 S.E.2d 680 (2016).
O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45(a) (2017).
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Foreclosure of the Right to Redeem to the property owner by certified and
first-class mail, setting a deadline of September 21, 2014, to redeem the
property. On September 23, 2014, the property owner sought to redeem
the property, but the redemption was rejected as it was made after the
September 21, 2014, deadline, set by the mailed notice. In October 2014,
the tax deed purchaser then published a Notice of Foreclosure of the
Right to Redeem in the relevant legal newspaper. The advertisement set
a redemption date of October 23, 2014, thus, making the property owner's
tender redemption timely. 399
In making its decision, the supreme court had to determine whether
the property owner was entitled to receive both notice through the mail
and notice through the advertisement before the right to redeem would
be foreclosed.4 00 The supreme court further noted that the constitutional
notice requirements were satisfied, in regards to the property owner, by
mailing.401 However, the supreme court noted the statute may enforce
additional notice requirements. 4 02 The supreme court determined that,
because the advertisement of the foreclosure was required in every
foreclosure of the right to redeem, the tax deed purchaser had not
satisfied all requirements of foreclosure laid out in O.C.G.A. § 48-4-45(a)
prior to the redemption tender, and, therefore, the tax deed purchaser
could not have refused the tender. 403
In addition, the court of appeals weighed in on how the tax sale
provisions interact with homeowner's and condominium associations. In
Harvest Assets, LLC v. Northlake Manor Condominium Ass'n, 404 the
court of appeals held that sums paid by a tax deed purchaser to satisfy
past-due condominium assessments were properly included in the
redemption amount. 405 In this case, the tax sale purchaser purchased a
property at a tax sale for $7600. The tax deed purchaser then paid $5000
for the condominium fees due after the tax sale. The condominium
association then sought to redeem the property by payment of the tax
sale price plus a 20% penalty, which was rejected. 406
In making its decision, the court of appeals noted that a tax deed
purchaser is obligated to pay homeowner's and condominium

399.
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404.
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Id. at 891-93, 792 S.E.2d at 681-82.
Id. at 893, 792 S.E.2d at 682.
Id. at 893-94, 792 S.E.2d at 682.
Id.
Id. at 895-96, 792 S.E.2d at 683.
340 Ga. App. 237, 796 S.E.2d 319 (2017).
Id. at 238, 796 S.E.2d at 320.
Id. at 237, 796 S.E.2d at 319.
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assessments. 407 The court of appeals further noted that "[i]f it is
appropriate
to
obligate
a
tax
deed
purchaser
to
pay
homeowner/condominium assessments in order to prevent the possibility
of a windfall profit to that purchaser . . . it is equally appropriate to

obligate the redeeming taxpayer to make that purchaser whole by
reimbursing any such assessment payments."4 08 Accordingly, the court of
appeals held that the term "special assessments," which could be added
in the redemption price under O.C.G.A. § 48-4-2, included private
assessments such as condominium assessments. 409

407. Id. at 238, 796 S.E.2d at 320.
408. Id.
409. Id.
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